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I.   INTRODUCTION
In 1990, Jeremy Bransford entered a Mobil Mini Mart filling station to
purchase some food items.1 Shortly thereafter, an argument arose between
Mr. Bransford and the filling station cashier.2 Suddenly, the cashier at-
tacked Mr. Bransford and beat him severely, causing permanent injury.3
Mr. Bransford filed suit against Mobil, alleging that Mobil had estab-
lished an apparent authority relationship with the operator of the filling
station, who was a Mobil franchisee.4 The evidence of apparent authority
included facts indicating that Mobil owned the property on which the
franchise was located, sold Mobil products at the filling station, used
Mobil trademarks and logos throughout the premises, and sent Mobil rep-
resentatives to the station to provide various routine support services.5
Further, the franchise agreement required the use of Mobil symbols and
                                                                                                         
1. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d 119, 120 (Fla. 1995).
2. Id. at 122 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 120.
5. Id.
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the selling of Mobil products,6 and the filling station employee was wear-
ing the Mobil logo on his clothing when he attacked Mr. Bransford.7
On January 25, 1995, the Supreme Court of Florida entered summary
judgment in favor of Mobil Oil Corporation; the court found that there
was no material issue of fact on the question of whether Mobil had in-
curred liability under the doctrine of apparent authority.8 Mr. Bransford’s
allegations, stated the court, “clearly fail[ed] to allege even the minimum
level of a ‘representation’ necessary to create an apparent agency relation-
ship.”9
By effectively ruling that a franchisor cannot be held liable for the
torts of a franchisee, despite a level of representation clearly adequate to
warrant a jury trial on the issue of whether a reasonable person would be-
lieve that the franchisee was the apparent agent of the franchisor, the
Florida Supreme Court has virtually eliminated the doctrine of apparent
authority as a means of imposing vicarious liability in the franchising in-
dustry.10 This Note argues that the Florida Supreme Court’s grant of
summary judgment in Mobil Oil despite ample evidence of apparent
authority will likely set precedent leading to inefficient economic results
and inequitable decisions in future cases involving customers injured by
the negligence of a business operator. Part II of this Note provides a brief
history of legal developments in oil company franchise cases and illus-
trates the challenges courts have faced in applying traditional vicarious li-
ability principles in the context of modern franchise arrangements. Part
III discusses the court’s holding in Mobil Oil and assesses the current
status of vicarious liability law in Florida. In part IV, the rationale sup-
porting the concept of vicarious liability is explored in order to analyze
the impact the court’s decision will have on Florida’s agency law juris-
prudence. Finally, alternative approaches are suggested for developing a
theory that will better implement the policy goals behind vicarious liabil-
ity in light of the commercial realities of the developing franchise indus-
try.
II.   HISTORY OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN OIL COMPANY FRANCHISING
Try to recall how many times you have patronized a filling station.
How many times have you stopped to fill up your tank, ask directions, or
purchase a drink from a filling station with a food mart? Over a thousand?
                                                                                                         
6. Id.
7. Id. at 122 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 121.
9. Id.
10. Compare Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1995) with Holiday
Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (finding that a jury could rea-
sonably determine that Holiday Inns, Inc. established an apparent agency relationship with its
franchisee because the franchisee displayed the Holiday Inns sign and logo on its premises).
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Maybe five thousand? Did you ever wonder who really operated the fill-
ing station, or whether you could recover from the station in the event of
injury?
Use of franchising as a form of business arrangement has steadily in-
creased over the past several decades, with franchising arrangements be-
coming a particularly popular method for oil companies to distribute their
products.11 Vicarious liability suits against franchisors have likewise con-
tinued to rise.12 Cases involving torts of filling station franchisees have
presented a constant challenge for Florida courts, which have sought to
develop a theory of vicarious liability that will produce equitable results
for injured plaintiffs without placing an unreasonable burden on the fran-
chising industry.13 The theories of liability developed by courts in oil
company franchise cases often have implications beyond the oil industry;
the precedent set in these cases frequently dictates who will bear the ulti-
mate cost when customers are injured as the result of negligent business
operations.14
The earliest cases involving the liability of oil companies for the acts
of their service station operators relied exclusively upon the doctrine of
respondeat superior as the basis for holding the oil company liable.15 The
concept of respondeat superior, or “imputed negligence,” rests on the
premise that by reason of some relation existing between A and B, A may
incur liability for B’s negligence, even though A has not been negligent.16
In order to determine whether the necessary agency relationship exists to
hold A liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, courts will exam-
ine, among other matters, the extent to which A controlled or had the
right to exercise control over the time, manner, and method of B’s
work.17 Therefore, the principal aspects courts examine include the
                                                                                                         
11. Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise Relationship Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors , 45
BUS. LAW. 289, 291 (1989) (stating that U.S. Department of Commerce estimated, by 1986,
that retail sales by franchise establishments had grown to represent 34% of all retail sales by).
While state law dictates the precise definition of the term “franchise,” most definitions have a
combination of the following: (a) either a marketing plan or a community of interest element,
(b) a trademark element, and (c) a fee element. Id at 292-93.
12. David A. Beyer, Franchise Vicarious Liability in Florida: A Survey and Recent D e-
velopments, FLA. B.J., Feb. 1995, at 18. Beyer states that from 1960 through 1993, there ap-
pears to have been 11 reported opinions dealing with vicarious liability in the franchise indus-
try in Florida. Id. As of the date of Mr. Beyer’s survey, there were already four opinions re-
ported in Florida in 1994. Id.
13. See, e.g., Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir.) (two-one decision), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971); Mobil Oil, 648 So. 2d at 119.
14. See, e.g., Mobil Oil, 648 So. 2d 119.
15. Charles R. Britt, Note, Agency—Apparent Authority and Agency by Estoppel:
Emerging Theories of Oil Company Liability for Torts of Service Station Operators , 50 N.C.
L. REV. 647, 648 (1972).
16. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at
499 (5th ed. 1984). This Note addresses the rationale behind vicarious liability infra part IV.
17. E.g., Leach v. Brilad Oil Co., 753 F. Supp. 366, 368 (S.D. Ga. 1991). Additional
factors courts may take into account in determining whether the requisite degree of control or
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working relationship between the parties and the written contract or fran-
chise agreement.18 Unless the circumstances indicate that A maintained
the ability to exercise the requisite degree of control over B’s work,19 A
cannot be held liable for B’s negligent acts under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior.20
Unlike the doctrine of respondeat superior, which normally requires
the presence of an actual agency relationship (and therefore control), ap-
parent authority is a form of implied agency; implied agency is entirely
distinct from actual authority (and therefore from the control require-
ment).21 The Second Restatement of Agency defines apparent authority as
“the power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions
with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in
accordance with the other’s manifestations to such third persons.”22
In Florida, three elements must exist for a finding of apparent authori-
ty: a) a representation by the purported principal that the alleged agent is
acting on its behalf; b) a reliance on that representation by a third party;
and c) a change in position by the third party.23 The representations of the
principal may be made directly to a third person or may be made to the
                                                                                                         
the right to it exists include: the kind of occupation and the customs of the community as to
whether the employer usually supervises the type of work involved; whether the one employed
is engaged in a distinct business or occupation and the skill required of the employee; who
supplies the place and instrumentalities of the work; the length of time the employment is to
last; and the method of payment. KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, at 501.
While courts must balance all possible factors to determine whether a master-servant rela-
tionship exists, Prosser and Keeton state that a relatively accurate rule-of-thumb considers
whether the community would regard the person employed as part of the employer’s working
staff. Id. at 501, 502. If the community would view the employee in this manner, it may be
said that the employee is a “servant” of the employer and that the employer may be held vi-
cariously liable for the employees’ torts within the scope of employment. Id.
The idea that the master is capable of maintaining sufficient control over the servant’s duties
to eliminate the possibility that the servant will act negligently will not prove valid in many
circumstances. Cf. id. at 500 (stating that the “control” a master has over a servant is more or
less fictional). Further, the rule-of-thumb stated by Prosser and Keeton and many of the indicia
that courts purport to examine suggest that the doctrine of respondeat superior stems from con-
cepts of reliance or estoppel. Since the rationale behind the theories of reliance and estoppel,
discussed infra part IV, remains valid despite the absence of the control element, the control
requirement of the doctrine of respondeat superior seems to amount to a limitation imposed by
courts to limit the scope of vicarious liability and not a rationally indispensable element. Cf. id.
(explaining that English courts receded from the control requirement as a requisite to vicarious
liability soon after 1700 in order to deal with the complications of commerce and industry).
18. Britt, supra note 15, at 648.
19. The courts, of course, maintain much latitude in determining the requisite degree of
control necessary in each case.
20. See, e.g., Leach, 753 F. Supp. at 368.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. a (1957).
22. Id. § 8.
23. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1995). Note that, although the
franchisor need not actually exercise control over the franchisee to be held liable under appar-
ent authority, the plaintiff must reasonably believe that the franchisor does exercise such con-
trol, or maintains the authority to do so, in order to establish the reliance requirement.
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community by signs, advertising, authorizing the agent to state that he is
permitted to act on behalf of the principal, or continuously employing the
agent.24
In 1971, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided for the first time,
in Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc.,25 that an oil company could be held liable for the
acts of a filling station franchisee under the doctrines of apparent author-
ity and agency by estoppel, despite the absence of control by the fran-
chisor over the franchisee.26  In Gizzi, the plaintiff was injured when the
brakes failed on a car that he had bought from an employee of a Texaco
station.27 The trial court noted that no actual agency existed between Tex-
aco and the employee who sold the car because the employee sold the car
on his own behalf, not on behalf of Texaco.28 However, the plaintiff as-
serted that Texaco had clothed the employee with apparent authority to
make the repairs and sell the car of behalf of Texaco.29 In support of his
theory of liability, the plaintiff introduced evidence that Texaco’s insignia
and slogan “[t]rust your car to the man who wears the star” were promi-
nently displayed.30 The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania granted Texaco’s motion for summary judgment, but
the Third Circuit reversed, stating that “[w]hile the evidence on behalf of
appellants by no means amounted to an overwhelming case of liability . .
. reasonable men could differ regarding [the sufficiency of the evidence to
establish apparent agency] and . . . the issue should have been determined
by the jury . . . .”31
                                                                                                         
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 21, § 8 cmt. b.
25. 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 309.
28. Id. at 310.
29. Id. at 309.
30. Id. at 310. Other evidence mentioned by the court included proof that Texaco
leased the property on which the filling station was located to its employee, that Texaco
owned certain pieces of equipment used at the station and sold its products at the station,
and that Texaco engaged in substantial national advertising not only to promote Texaco
products, but also to convey the impression that Texaco dealers were skilled in automotive
servicing. Id. at 309-10.
Here, as in many other cases involving apparent authority, the court failed to distinguish
those factors relevant to the apparent authority analysis from those not relevant under this
theory. Because apparent authority is based solely on concepts of reliance and estoppel,
those facts of which third parties have no knowledge (such as who owns the land and
equipment, the content of the franchise contract, etc.) should not be relevant in the apparent
agency determination. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, supra note 21, § 8 cmt. a
(stating that apparent authority is entirely distinct from authority, either express or im-
plied). The failure of courts to distinguish factual elements relied upon to establish apparent
authority from those relevant only to actual authority leads to much of the confusion sur-
rounding the basis for these two theories.
31. Gizzi, 437 F.2d at 310.
842 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:837
Since most franchise relationships fall short of creating an actual
agency,32 the Third Circuit’s holding in Gizzi broadened the scope of po-
tential liability for oil companies in franchise arrangements by recogniz-
ing that the theory of apparent authority, as well as that of actual agency,
could provide the basis for holding an oil company liable for the acts of a
franchisee.33 Although other federal and state courts since Gizzi have used
the doctrine of apparent authority to hold franchisors responsible for the
acts of their franchisees,34 the use of the apparent authority doctrine in the
franchise context has received substantial criticism since franchisors are
left open to extremely broad liability.35 Broad liability results because
plaintiffs can usually point out ample indicia of representation in a mod-
ern franchise arrangement to allege vicarious liability under apparent
authority.36 These elements of representation are particularly prevalent in
most oil company franchise arrangements.37 Besides representation, the
other two elements necessary to hold a franchisor vicariously liable for a
franchisee’s actions—reasonable reliance on the representation and change
in position—do not require a high degree of proof to support the allega-
tion.
To protect franchisors from the potentially broad liability imposed by
the apparent authority doctrine, some courts have adopted a theory re-
ferred to as the common knowledge doctrine.38 The common knowledge
doctrine assumes that the public understands that oil companies and cer-
tain other businesses commonly enter into franchise agreements whereby
the franchisee displays the logos, markings, slogans, and other indicia of
the franchisor, although the franchisee maintains control over daily busi-
ness operations.39 Courts adopting this theory reason that since the public
                                                                                                         
32. Robert W. Emerson, Franchisors’ Liability when Franchisees Are Apparent Agents:
An Empirical and Policy Analysis of “Common Knowledge” About Franchising , 20 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 609, 621-22 (1992).
33. Gizzi, 437 F.2d at 310.
34. See, e.g., Sutton v. Chevron Oil Co., 514 P.2d 1301 (N.M. Ct. App.), rev’d, 515
P.2d 1283 (N.M. 1973).
35. Emerson, supra note 32, at 628.
36. Comment, “You Can Trust the Man Who Wears the Star"—Or Can You?: The Use of
Apparent Authority To Establish a Prin ciple’s Tort Liability, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 257, 267
(1971) (commenting that from the fact pattern in Gizzi, it is difficult to conceive of any situa-
tion where an inference of apparent authority would not be warranted). See Robert N. Davis,
Jr., Comment, Service Station Torts: Time for the Oil Companies To Assume Their Share of
the Responsibility, 10 CAL. W. L. REV. 382, 390-91, 396 (1974).
37. See Smith v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 346 F.2d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 1965) (stating that it is
generally recognized that provisions in service station leasing agreements almost universally pro-
vide that the lessee may display the lessor’s brand signs and honor the lessor’s credit cards and
that the lessor may make suggestions as to the operation of the station and may terminate the
lease); Emerson, supra note 32, at 620-21 (stating that numerous examples exist of courts’ finding
or permitting a jury to find an agency relationship based on vicarious liability in the gasoline in-
dustry).
38. Emerson, supra note 32, at 645.
39. Id.
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is deemed to understand that the franchisor actually has no significant
control over a franchisee, a plaintiff cannot show that he or she relied
upon the franchisor’s reputation in choosing to do business with the fran-
chisee.40 Thus, the common knowledge doctrine prevents a plaintiff from
proving the element of reliance, despite the franchisee’s display of signs,
logos, or other indicia of the franchisor, unless additional facts exist to
warrant the plaintiff’s reliance upon the franchisor’s business reputation.41
III.   MOBIL OIL CORP. V. BRANSFORD
Courts normally use the common knowledge doctrine to support a
summary judgment ruling, thereby removing the case from the jury and
the fact-finding stage.42 However, some courts have employed alternative
methods to circumvent the jury’s fact-finding function in apparent author-
ity cases. One such method is to grant summary judgment on the basis
that the indicia of franchisor control displayed by the franchisee falls short
of the minimum level required for the plaintiff to go to the jury.43 This is
what the Supreme Court of Florida did in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford.44
A.   Facts and Procedural History
In 1990, eighteen-year-old Jeremy Bransford entered a Mobil Mini
Mart gas station in Fort Lauderdale to purchase a sandwich.45 Mr. Brans-
ford exchanged sharp words with the cashier, Hyman Stetham.46 The con-
frontation escalated and, without warning, Stetham punched Bransford
three times in the face.47 Bransford’s facial bones were crushed in three
places; the injuries required permanent implantation of metal plates and
screws in Bransford’s face.48 After the incident, Bransford continued to
experience pain when chewing and had blurred vision.49
                                                                                                         
40. Id.
41. Id. Such indicia could include circumstances similar to those in Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc.,
437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971), where an advertising campaign was designed by the franchisor to
encourage customers to utilize service facilities of franchise stations, in addition to purchasing
the franchisor’s products.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v, Lesch, 570 A.2d 840 (Md. 1990). In
Chevron, the court distinguished the circumstances surrounding the advertising campaign in
Gizzi from a pattern of facts involving a similar advertising campaign previously conducted,
but nearly terminated, prior to the alleged tortious incident. The court found that the latter
situation did not provide the additional basis for the reasonable reliance necessary to overcome
the common knowledge doctrine. Id. at 843.
42. Emerson, supra note 32, at 648.
43. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d 119, 121 (Fla. 1995) (finding that despite the
filling station’s display of Mobil’s logo, colors, and trademark symbols, the plaintiff clearly failed to
allege the minimum level of representation necessary to create an apparent agency relationship).
44. Id.
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The Mobil station where the incident occurred was owned by Mobil
and leased to Alan Berman.50 Stetham, who allegedly had a history of as-
saulting customers, was Berman’s employee.51 Bransford sued Mobil on
the theory that Mobil had established an apparent agency with Berman
and, therefore, had assumed vicarious liability for torts arising out of
Berman’s operation of the filling station.52
To show apparent authority, Bransford indicated that Mobil owned the
property on which the station was located; Mobil trademarks and symbols
were used throughout the premises; the franchise agreement required the
use of Mobil symbols and the sale of Mobil products; and Mobil allegedly
sent representatives to the station to provide routine support services.53
Further, Bransford presented evidence that employees of the station were
required to wear Mobil uniforms and that Stetham was wearing a Mobil
hat when he attacked Bransford.54
After hearing oral argument, the trial court granted Mobil’s motion for
summary judgment without opinion.55 Bransford sought review of the trial
court’s ruling on apparent authority in the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal, which reversed the summary judgment, after finding that “Mobil
might be liable under the theory of apparent agency . . . .”56 Mobil peti-
tioned the Florida Supreme Court for review.57 The court granted review
since the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision was in apparent
conflict with the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in Orlando Executive
Park, Inc. v. Robbins,58 in which the court indicated that an oil company
could not confer apparent authority on a service station franchisee by al-
lowing the franchisee to use the franchisor’s name and sell its products.59
B.   Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Decision
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal and entered summary judgment in favor of Mobil on the grounds that
the factual allegations in Bransford’s complaint “clearly fail[ed] to allege
even the minimum level of a ‘representation’ necessary to create an ap-
parent agency relationship.”60 The court noted that in cases of alleged ap-
parent agency, something must have happened to communicate to the
plaintiff that the franchisor was exercising substantial control over the
                                                                                                         




54. Id. at 122 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
55. Petitioner’s Brief at 3.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Id.
58. 433 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1983).
59. Mobil Oil, 648 So. 2d at 121.
60. Id.
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franchisee.61 The majority found that Bransford’s evidence of representa-
tion failed to state a cause of action against Mobil because “[i]n today’s
world, it is well understood that the mere use of franchise logos and re-
lated advertisements does not necessarily indicate that the franchisor has
actual or apparent control over any substantial aspect of the franchisee’s
business or employment decisions.”62 Further, the provision of routine
contractual support services does not change the result,63 and actual own-
ership of the premises is relevant only to the extent that such ownership
may indicate some degree of actual or apparent control over the business,
which the facts in Mobil Oil did not indicate.64
The court distinguished Mobil Oil from a seemingly conflicting case,
Orlando Executive Park, on the basis that the franchisor’s direct partici-
pation in Orlando Executive Park was sufficient to represent to the public
that the franchisor exercised substantial control over the franchisee’s
business.65 In Orlando Executive Park, the plaintiff sued the Howard
Johnson Company after she was attacked at a Howard Johnson Motor
Lodge operated by an independent company, Orlando Executive Park,
Inc.66 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal’s decision that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence at trial
to support the trial court’s finding of apparent authority.67
In Orlando Executive Park, the Florida Supreme Court cited with ap-
proval the Fifth District Court of Appeal decision, which stated: “[W]hile
[Orlando Executive Park, Inc.] might not be [Howard Johnson’s] agent
for all purposes, the signs, national advertising, uniformity of building
design and color schemes allow the public to assume that this and other
similar motor lodges are under the same ownership.”68 The court believed
that  Howard Johnson’s operation of the restaurant, lounge, and adult
theater at the motel constituted additional evidence that Howard Johnson
had established an apparent agency relationship with the franchisee.69 The
opinion stated that “[t]he complex was an integrated commercial enter-
prise, and [Howard Johnson’s] direct participation was significant.”70 The
Mobil Oil court focused on the latter factor in distinguishing Mobil Oil
from Orlando Executive Park and concluded that “[t]he fact [that the
franchisor actually operated several components within the complex in
question] alone obviously and directly ‘represented’ to the public that the
                                                                                                         
61. Id.
62. Id. at 120.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 121.
65. Id.; Orlando Executive Park, Inc. v. Robbins, 433 So. 2d 491, 492 (Fla. 1983).
66. Orlando Executive Park , 433 So. 2d at 492.
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franchisor was in substantial control of the business [in Orlando Executive
Park] . . . .”71
In Orlando Executive Park, the Florida Supreme Court resolved an
apparent conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision in
Sydenham v. Santiago,72 where no apparent agency was found between an
oil company and a franchisee filling station despite signs and other indicia
of representation similar to those of Howard Johnson in Orlando Execu-
tive Park.73 The court explained that the apparently anomalous rulings did
not conflict because “the district court [in Orlando Executive Park] has
set out the proper standard, limiting Sydenham and other oil company
cases to their facts, and [the court] disapprove[s] extending the language
of Sydenham [indicating that oil companies do not confer apparent
authority on their franchisees by allowing the franchisee to use the fran-
chisor’s trade name and sell its products] into cases such as the instant
one . . . . “74
In Mobil Oil, the court clearly abrogated the portion of the holding in
Orlando Executive Park that purported to distinguish the degree of repre-
sentation required to find an apparent agency relationship in oil company
cases from the degree of representation required in other franchise cases.75
The opinion stated:
[The court] recognize[s] that Orlando Executive Park  suggested that oil
company cases somehow are different from other franchising cases and
that logos or other trademark symbols alone can create an apparent
agency [in franchise cases not involving oil companies]. Because [the
court] believe[s] these to be erroneous impressions, [it] recede[s] from
Orlando Executive Park to the extent it is inconsistent with this opin-
ion.76
From the language in Mobil Oil, one can surmise that no apparent
agency relationship can exist between any type of franchisor and franchi-
see on the basis of representation by signs, logos, employee clothing,
provision of routine support services, ownership of the premises on which
the business is located, or any of the other indicia of representation al-
leged by Bransford in his complaint. To avoid summary judgment and get
to the jury on the issue of apparent authority in franchise arrangements,
plaintiffs will have to present additional evidence that the franchisor
“participated in some substantial way in directing or managing acts of the
                                                                                                         
71. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d 119, 121 (Fla. 1995).
72. 392 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
73. Compare Orlando Executive Park , 433 So. 2d at 494 with Sydenham, 392 So. 2d at
357.
74. Sydenham, 392 So. 2d at 357.
75. Mobil Oil, 648 So. 2d at 121.
76. Id.
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franchisee . . . .”77 The only example we have of evidence the Florida Su-
preme Court believes adequate to avoid summary judgment under this
standard is that involved in the Orlando Executive Park scenario, where
the franchisor actually operates several components within a single com-
plex, leaving only some components under the control of the franchisee.78
This scenario is particularly unlikely to occur in oil company franchises,
in which the entire filling station is often operated by the franchisee.
Future plaintiffs will find it particularly difficult to allege apparent
authority because the Mobil Oil opinion mixed apparent agency concepts,
such as indicia of representation, with actual agency concepts, such as
control of certain business operations.79 By requiring plaintiffs to demon-
strate franchisor control to prove the element of representation, the court
has basically limited franchisor liability to instances of actual authority.80
As discussed previously, since most franchisors do not maintain actual
control over their franchisees’ operations, most franchisors cannot be held
liable for the acts of their franchisees on the basis of actual authority.81
While the court could have limited the Mobil Oil ruling to oil company
cases, the court opted to make the holding applicable to all types of fran-
chises.82 At least one commentator has noted that limiting the liability of
oil company franchises, while leaving other types of franchisors open to
broader liability, may be justified on the basis that oil companies use their
franchisees merely to distribute their products, while other types of fran-
chises, such as hotels and food service companies, involve the franchising
of a specific business format.83 Because oil company franchisors are nor-
mally not concerned with how their service station franchisees operate,
these franchisors can distribute their products through service station
franchisees without exercising control over the franchisees’ business for-
mat.84 Arguably, the less control a franchisor exercises over the franchi-
sees’ business methods, the less liability exposure the franchisor should
be expected to bear for the franchisees’ negligence.85
However, by receding from its earlier opinion in Orlando Executive
Park, which indicated that oil company franchises would be treated under
a different standard from other types of franchises, the court declined to
                                                                                                         
77. Id. at 120.
78. Id. at 121.
79. See Beyer, supra note 12, at 66. Beyer comments that because of Mobil Oil, plaintiffs
will have to try to establish the representation element by noting instances of actual control by
the franchisor. However, if a plaintiff can show actual control, the claim should be based on
actual, not apparent, agency. Id.
80. Id.
81. See supra part II.
82. See supra part III.B.
83. See Beyer, supra note 12, at 20.
84. See id.
85. However, this reasoning again confuses control by the franchisor with the apparent
authority determination.
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accept the common knowledge doctrine as a means of limiting the liability
of specified franchises, such as those involving oil companies.86 The
court’s decision to extend its holding to all types of franchises, rather than
to limit the holding to oil companies, makes Mobil Oil an exceptionally
drastic and broad-reaching decision. For the first time in over thirty
years, the apparent authority doctrine will be virtually unavailable as a
means of recovery to plaintiffs who are injured when the company that
owns all of the assets of a particular business contracts with an insolvent
third party to operate the business, even if the company in ownership
continues to represent to the public that the owner maintains control over
the business operations. The result is that, under Mobil Oil, all a company
has to do to avoid liability for a dangerous or a negligently operated busi-
ness is to contract the operation of the business to a third party.87 The
franchisor can then continue to market its products or services, while rep-
resenting to the public that the franchisor still operates the business, with-
out incurring any potential tort liability.
Businesses such as the oil, hotel, and fast food industries, which utilize
an extensive franchise system of marketing and distribution, will likely
view the Mobil Oil decision as long overdue relief from an onerous cause
of action that places an unfair burden on industry and stifles economic
growth. Many franchisors believe that apparent authority unfairly allows a
plaintiff to hold a business liable for the negligence of its franchisees de-
spite the fact that the business did not, and possibly could not, control the
actions of its franchisees.88 These businesses argue further that imposing
broad liability on franchisors makes the use of an efficient business ar-
rangement impractical, if not impossible, and that communities ultimately
will suffer from the resultant lack of economic growth.89
Further, many franchisors (and also some courts) feel that the apparent
authority doctrine is unfair because courts and juries will often overlook
the requirements of the rule to allow a sympathetic plaintiff to recover
from a large corporation.90 Prior to Mobil Oil, most apparent authority
cases in the franchise context were contested over the reliance element.91
Since reliance is a jury question with no clearly defined standards, some
courts have received heavy criticism for finding reliance where none could
reasonably have been found in order to allow an injured plaintiff to recover.92
                                                                                                         
86. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d 119, 121 (Fla. 1995).
87. Id. at 120-21.
88. See Randall K. Hanson, The Franchising Dilemma: Franchisor Liability for Actions of
a Local Franchisee, 19 N.C. CENT. L.J. 190, 193 (1991).
89. See id.
90. See Emerson, supra note 32, at 628.
91. Beyer, supra note 12, at 66.
92. Emerson, supra note 32, at 628-29. Emerson cites Buchanon v. Canada Dry Corp.,
226 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (reversing the lower court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of the defendant franchisor despite the fact that no third-party reliance could have ex-
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After Mobil Oil, apparent authority cases will no longer hinge on the reli-
ance requirement alone; plaintiffs will now have to overcome a nearly
impossible hurdle to avoid summary judgment on the representation ele-
ment and reach a jury trial on the issue of reliance.93
Despite some legitimate arguments in favor of limiting the liability of
franchisors under the apparent authority doctrine, the court’s controver-
sial decision virtually to eliminate vicarious liability in the franchising in-
dustry holds some potentially serious consequences for tort victims and
for society. By holding that no apparent authority can exist despite the
presence of the signs, logos, and other indicia of franchisor control pres-
ent in Mobil Oil, the Florida Supreme Court has perverted the apparent
authority doctrine and, in so doing, has undercut the rationale behind the
doctrine in a way that will likely lead to unjust and uneconomical results
in future cases involving the torts of franchisees. This Note now explores
the social and economic theories upon which the doctrine of vicarious li-
ability is based in order to analyze the impact the Mobil Oil decision will
have on Florida’s agency law jurisprudence.
IV.   RATIONALES BEHIND VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Why should the owner of a business be held liable for the actions of a
franchisee, particularly when the owner does not exert any control over
the franchisee’s business operations?
Two schools of thought describe the chief reasons courts and scholars
have asserted for holding a party who may not have been at fault liable
for the negligent acts of another party. The first school holds that liability
is imposed in order to produce economically efficient results, which ulti-
mately provide the most favorable situation for individuals in our soci-
ety.94 Alternatively, the second school asserts that vicarious liability arises
out of ideas about social justice and moral responsibility.95 While these
two rationales differ in their philosophical approach, both provide com-
                                                                                                         
isted to support a finding of apparent agency in a case involving the franchisee’s negligent op-
eration of a truck), to illustrate how some courts have perverted the apparent authority doctrine
to allow a plaintiff to recover from a franchisor where no actual agency existed.
93. See Beyer, supra note 12, at 66.
94. This school of thought is based on the law and economics theory. For an example of a
law and economics analysis of tort liability, see Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Di s-
tribution and the Law of Torts , 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987); S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987).
95. This school of thought is embodied in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, su-
pra note 21. For further analysis of the relationship between tort law and moral theory, see
JEFFERY G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 54-84 (1987) and George
P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective , 87 COLUM. L. REV. 533 (1987).
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pelling reasons for enforcing a system of vicarious liability.96 This Note
now examines these two schools of thought in order to provide the reader
with an understanding of the foundations of the apparent authority doc-
trine.
A.   Efficient Allocation of Resources Theory
Enterprise liability describes the idea that an enterprise should bear the
costs the enterprise engenders, rather than distributing risk on the basis of
fault.97 The enterprise liability school of thought is based on an allocation
of resources justification.98 The ethical postulate at the heart of this con-
cept is that people generally know what is best for themselves and will re-
spond logically according to market incentives and disincentives.99 A pure
system of enterprise liability requires two elements: first, the cost of in-
juries must be borne by the activities that cause them, whether or not fault
is involved, because the injury is a real cost of those activities; second,
among the several parties engaged in an enterprise, the loss should be
placed on the party most likely to cause the burden to be reflected in the
price of whatever the enterprise sells.100
Proponents of the enterprise liability theory argue that, in many, but
not all,101 circumstances, enterprise liability will lead to more efficient re-
source allocation and less cost to society.102 For example, if the govern-
ment suddenly were to pay the cost of all auto accidents, people would no
longer need to buy insurance, and the result would be that some people
would buy more cars.103 The effect would be the same if the government
suddenly chose to pay the cost of steel used by auto manufacturers and to
raise the money out of taxes.104 In each case, an economist would say re-
sources are misallocated because goods are produced that the purchaser
would not buy if he really had to pay the full extent of their cost to soci-
ety.105 Enterprise liability corrects this misallocation by placing all of the
costs associated with producing a product on the manufacturer. This will
cause the true cost of the product to be reflected in the price of the product,
                                                                                                         
96. For a theory based on the proposition that tort law is a mixture of economic efficiency
and moral justice, see Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice , 67
IND. L.J. 349 (1992).
97. Calabresi, supra note 94, at 500. For further commentary on the concept of strict li-
ability in tort law, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 94, at 54-84, and W. PAGE KEETON ET
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cussed supra part IV.A.i.
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103. Id. at 503.
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so that market forces will produce a more efficient allocation of re-
sources. According to the enterprise liability school, “the most desirable
system of loss distribution under a strict resource-allocation theory is one
in which the prices of goods accurately reflect their full cost to soci-
ety.”106
With respect to the oil company franchising industry, one commentator
illustrated the advantages that a nonfault system of liability based on effi-
cient allocation of resources may provide over a fault-based system by ex-
amining Smith v. Cities Service Oil Co.107 In Cities Service, a negligent
repair case, the district court granted the oil company’s motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed.108 Applying the control test, the circuit court held that the
operator was an independent contractor, rather than an agent of the
owner, because the operator had control over the day-to-day operations of
the station, including the repair business.109
The operator, who was the eleventh operator of the station in less than
seven years, had filed for bankruptcy about eight months after the acci-
dent.110 The operator had little, if any, insurance and no personal assets with
which to pay damages.111 The station itself could not even be sold to pay the
judgment because Cities Service owned the land, the station, and the major
pieces of equipment.112 The operator merely leased the station from Cities
Service and agreed to sell Cities Service’s products.113
The commentator explained that under the fault-based system of liabili-
ty, the insolvency of the operator worked to the mutual benefit of the par-
ties.114 The operator, who had no significant assets to invest, was able to
lease the station from Cities Service for very little cost.115 This opportunity
encouraged the operator to undertake the business and attracted additional
                                                                                                         
106. Id. at 505.
107. Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability , 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1266
(1984) (citing Smith v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 346 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1965)).
108. Smith, 346 F.2d at 349. In Smith, the service station operator poured gasoline into a
hot carburetor and the gasoline ignited. Id. The operator then threw the gasoline onto the
plaintiff, who sustained severe burns. Id.
109. Id. at 352.
110. Id. at 351-52.
111. Sykes, supra note 107, at 1267.
112. Id.
113. Id. Knowing that it might make the operator a servant, Cities Service did not pay him
a straight salary.
114. See id.
115. Id. The details of the contracts between Cities Service and the station operator also
indicated that Cities Service had renegotiated the operator’s rent on numerous occasions. One
agreement called for the operator to pay only $1 per month in rent, and another guaranteed the
operator net earnings of $335 a month. Id. The Seventh Circuit attributed these modifications
to the “impecunious nature of the operation, coupled with the defendant’s desire that the sta-
tion be operated as an outlet for its products.” Id. (citing Smith, 346 F.2d at 349).
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customers for Cities Service’s products.116 The operator did not assume
great risk for potential tort claims because Cities Service owned the sta-
tion.117 After the accident, the insolvent operator obtained a discharge in
bankruptcy and moved on to other employment, while Cities Service
found a new operator for the station.118
This scenario illustrates how a rule of personal liability can produce
extremely inefficient and inequitable results. Such a rule makes possible
the continued operation of a business that probably cannot recover its
marginal social costs, while encouraging the principal to use agents who
have little, if anything, at risk and who consequently have diminished in-
centives to avoid losses. In this type of situation, vicarious liability will
almost certainly provide more efficient resource allocation by creating
additional incentives for the principal to provide adequate loss-avoidance
incentives and to improve resource allocation by closing down unprofit-
able operations.119
There are three separate premises offering justification for the alloca-
tion of resources theory: 1) the risk-spreading rationale, 2) the loss pre-
vention rationale, and 3) the deep pocket rationale.120 These three theories
will now be addressed in order to analyze further the basis for the alloca-
tion of resources theory. Particular attention will be paid to the effect
these theories have in the context of the oil franchising industry.
1.   Risk Spreading
The risk-spreading justification for nonfault liability rests on the idea
that if losses are broadly spread among people and over time, they are the
least harmful.121 In the purest form, risk spreading would probably be ac-
complished through some form of governmental accident relief program
spread among the population through taxes.122 In the absence of a gov-
ernmental program, enterprise liability would be essential to accomplish
risk spreading in the oil company franchise industry because the franchi-
see in an oil company franchise contract generally has no capacity to allo-
cate the risk to the public through what he or she charges.123 This is be-
cause prices are usually governed by the oil company, with the dealer re-
                                                                                                         
116. Id. The service station was marginally profitable for Cities Service to operate; the
main benefit to Cities Service came from a percentage earned from the sale of products. Id.
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119. See id. at 1268.
120. See Calabresi, supra note 94, at 517, 527; Emerson, supra note 32, at 634-36.
121. Calabresi, supra note 94, at 517.
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123. See Britt, supra note 15, at 652.
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ceiving a commission based on sales.124 Therefore, “[t]he oil company is
clearly in the best position to assess the business risks of social harm in-
volved in [the] operation and to distribute the risk to the public through its
prices.”125
Insofar as enterprise liability places the burden of risk on the party
most likely to insure against such risks, the system accomplishes a large
degree of risk spreading throughout time and among people.126 However,
the efficiency and the extent to which a system of enterprise liability ac-
complishes the goal of risk spreading will depend on the structure of the
industry involved, the nature of the costs charged, and the general eco-
nomic conditions.127 In an essentially competitive industry, substantial loss
spreading through wages and prices will occur so long as accident costs
vary with output or through the use of some specific resource in produc-
tion.128 The added cost of accidents will result in two effects: “(a) de-
creased output and higher prices, and (b) lower payments to, and de-
creased use of, those resources giving rise to the extra cost, assuming that
these [resources] can be identified.”129
However, if the industry were one in which substantial control over
price and output existed, such as in a monopoly, close-knit oligopoly, or
price-leader industry, no immediate risk spreading would occur as the re-
sult of enterprise liability.130 No risk spreading would result because this
sort of industry usually sets prices at a high enough level that any further
price rise results in a substantial loss of sales.131 A tight pricing structure
prevents these industries from shifting their increased costs to the con-
sumer.132 Exit from the industry is unlikely because the profits in such in-
dustries are probably sufficient to bear the extra costs.133 In this situation,
at least some of the burden will remain permanently on the industry in the
form of decreased profits, which may create a sick industry.134 Although
the oil industry probably most closely resembles an oligopoly or a price-
leader industry, substantial risk spreading would likely be possible be-
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126. Calabresi, supra note 94, at 518. However, if loss spreading were the only goal of a
system of liability, the most desirable system would consist of a government relief program
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127. Id. at 519.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 524. Since relatively few oil companies control most of our country’s oil sup-
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cause consumer demand for oil-based products, such as gasoline, is un-
likely to vary significantly from small or moderate price increases.
2.   Loss Prevention
The loss prevention rationale rests on two public policy precepts.135
“First, the franchisor is in a good position to select responsible franchi-
sees and to ensure that they exercise a high degree of care when dealing
with their customers.”136 Second, imposing vicarious liability encourages
the franchisor to maintain the highest possible standards during its selec-
tion and supervision processes.137 Imposing vicarious liability on the basis
of the loss prevention rationale encourages franchisors to maintain a
higher degree of control over their franchisees’ contractual dealings with
third parties.138 Under this rationale, placing liability on the oil company
would encourage franchisors to choose responsible franchisees, to super-
vise and inspect them routinely, and to ensure that their franchisees ac-
quire and maintain sufficient insurance to cover any damage award that
may result from the franchisee’s negligence.139
However, an overly broad application of the loss prevention rationale
could result in franchisor liability for franchisees’ actions that the fran-
chisor could not have reasonably contemplated.140 Further, complete su-
pervision of franchisees’ activities is often impossible.141 Despite the
limitations of this theory, its application would provide strong incentive
for franchisors to assume greater care and responsibility in ensuring that
their franchisees act in a responsible manner toward the public.
3.   Deep Pocket
The deep pocket rationale is often represented as the real reason be-
hind vicarious liability.142 Such a justification has been characterized as a
                                                                                                         
135. Emerson, supra note 32, at 636.
136. Id.
137. These two public policy precepts undergird the actual agency principle of respondeat
superior. Id.
138. While usually focused on tort claims, the loss prevention argument may serve equally
well in a contract context by providing incentive for the franchisor to maintain a high degree of
control over its franchisees’ books in order to ensure that the franchisor receives the proper
amount of royalties and other fees. Id. 636-37.
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defendant liable. KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, at 23.
140. Emerson, supra note 32, at 637.
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142. Britt, supra note 15, at 652.
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philosophy to take from the rich and give to the poor.143 Advocates of this
theory would argue that many franchises are extremely profitable and the
franchisors are better able to cover the costs of accidents than are inno-
cent victims.144 A franchisor typically receives profits from the actions of
the franchisee over the life of the franchise through the use of exclusive
dealing contracts.145 If the franchisor continues to profit from the con-
sumption of franchisor-supplied products, the franchise can reasonably be
expected to shoulder at least a portion of the liability burden.146
The goals of this type of system could be accomplished either through
a government accident compensation program paid out of progressive
taxes, or through a system of liability (such as vicarious liability) that
tended to put the burden of accidents on more wealthy litigants.147 Propo-
nents of a pure deep pocket system would likely see enterprise liability as
a halfway house to the ultimate goal of social insurance based on pro-
gressive taxes, which would probably be the ultimate means of distribut-
ing the burden of accident costs on those who could best afford them.148
While the deep pocket rationale, like the loss prevention theory, fails to
define appropriate limits to the scope of vicarious liability, many people
find it a legitimate and attractive justification for imposing vicarious li-
ability on franchisors.
B.   Reliance and Estoppel
The school of thought that imposes vicarious liability based on reliance
and estoppel, like the resource allocation school of thought, is not based
on concepts of individual fault.149 However, unlike the theory of resource
allocation, which is based on efficient or desirable allocation of resources,
the theories of reliance and estoppel focus on concepts of societal fair-
ness.150 Those who adhere to this school of thought would argue that the
true reason for imposing vicarious liability on franchisors is that franchi-
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144. Hanson, supra note 88, at 192.
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856 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:837
sors should not be able to enjoy the benefit of chain-store marketing
methods and national identification with their franchisees without assum-
ing concomitant social responsibilities.151
The theories of reliance and estoppel hold that uniform stores, signs,
and management methods give the consumer the impression that they are
dealing with a standardized business operation.152 This impression gives
greater market value to the franchisor’s trademark and the franchised op-
eration.153 In fact, one commentator has noted that the franchise contract
typically requires franchisees to assist the franchisor in “fooling the cus-
tomer” into thinking that they are doing business with an established
chain.154
If, as a result of such manifestations by the principal, the customer is
indeed fooled into thinking that he or she is conducting business with the
principal, the theory demands that the principal assume liability for any
accident that arises out of the transaction, so long as the plaintiff’s reli-
ance on the principal’s representation was reasonable.155 This is because
basic societal tenets dictate that the party who serves to gain through in-
ducing others to do business with its representatives should bear the costs
of the representative’s negligence, rather than the innocent customer’s
bearing such costs.156 As we have seen in Mobil Oil157 and Cities Serv-
ice,158 if liability cannot be imposed on the oil company franchisor, the
filling station franchisee may well be judgment proof and the unfortunate
plaintiff may be left to bear the burden of any resultant injury. Theories
of vicarious liability based on concepts of reliance and estoppel hold that
innocent individuals should not be subjected to such an injustice.159
While the resource allocation rationale for vicarious liability differs
from the reliance and estoppel rationale, both arguments are frequently
made, often in conjunction with one another, in support of a system that
allows liability to be imposed on a franchisor for the torts of its franchi-
see, notwithstanding the fact that the franchisor may not actually control
the franchisee.160 The theory of apparent agency was originally developed
as a theory of vicarious liability in order to make it possible for one party
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to be held accountable for the acts of another party in the absence of con-
trol by the principal.161 Placing liability on the principal, under the theory
of apparent agency, serves the policy goals behind the theories of efficient
allocation of resources and estoppel.162 By dictating that a franchisor can-
not be held liable for the torts of a franchisee, despite a level of represen-
tation clearly adequate to warrant a jury trial on the issue of representa-
tion, the Mobil Oil decision is abrogating the doctrine of apparent author-
ity as a means of imposing vicarious liability in the franchising industry.
The underlying reason for the court’s departure from the traditional un-
derstanding of apparent authority is that the court is seeking to protect the
franchising industry from potentially broad liability. However, by abro-
gating vicarious liability in the franchising industry, the court is com-
promising the social policies behind the doctrine of apparent authority at
the expense of the individual plaintiff and, ultimately, at the expense of
society.
V.   ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN OIL
COMPANY FRANCHISING
As discussed previously, courts have encountered great difficulty in
applying the doctrine of apparent authority in light of the rapidly develop-
ing system of franchising, such as that used extensively in the oil indus-
try.163 While most scholars would probably agree that a pure system of
enterprise liability, which would impose liability on the franchisor in all
cases, would prove unduly burdensome on industry and would not pro-
duce the optimum results for our society,164 most would likely agree that
society would benefit from a system of vicarious liability that advanced
the policy goals behind the allocation of resources and estoppel theories.
Several alternatives to the Mobil Oil approach allow the apparent author-
ity doctrine to remain intact in the franchising industry (thereby maintain-
ing the policy goals discussed in the preceding section of this Note), while
better accommodating the needs of the oil company franchising industry.
A.   Legislative Intervention
While scholars may harbor differing viewpoints on the extent to which
a principal should be held vicariously liable for the acts of its agent, one
element must exist for any of the objectives of a system of vicarious li-
ability to be effectuated—predictability. If the parties involved in oil com-
pany franchising arrangements, namely the consumer, the service station
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operator, and the oil company, are unable to determine who will ulti-
mately bear the expense of a franchisee’s negligence, neither the alloca-
tion of resources theory nor the reliance theory will effectively accom-
plish their respective goals.
The allocation of resources theory is based on the idea that the fran-
chisor, when faced with the burden of liability for its franchisee, will act
rationally to reduce or eliminate the risk of liability in the most efficient
manner and thus will accomplish the loss prevention objective.165 Any ex-
pense arising from the franchisor’s liability that cannot be eliminated will
then be passed on to the consumer and will thus accomplish the risk-
spreading objective.166 Since the franchisor is able efficiently to reduce
losses and spread the remaining expense among consumers, it can operate
at a substantial profit and thus can afford to bear much of the burden of
mishaps.167
However, this chain of events will not occur if the franchisor cannot
predict with some degree of certainty when the franchisor will be held li-
able for expenses arising from the torts of its franchisees. The franchisor,
acting in an economically rational manner, will not incur additional ex-
pense in the form of insurance or risk-prevention measures if the fran-
chisor cannot be reasonably certain that it will be held liable consistently
enough that the additional expense of such measures will ultimately be
less than that which the franchisor would be required to pay in damages to
those injured by its franchisees’ negligence. Likewise, franchisees will
not incur additional expense to eliminate or insure against unsafe condi-
tions if a significant possibility exists that they will not be held account-
able if accidents do occur. In the absence of a reliable system of liability,
the parties cannot plan for their needs, and the societal objectives con-
templated by the theory of efficient resource allocation will not be ac-
complished.
Predictability is also necessary for the reliance-based doctrines to ac-
complish their goal of producing an equitable outcome for injured parties.
If the public is unable to determine which service stations are actually run
by companies that are in a position to compensate customers for injuries
incurred as a result of the negligence of the operator, customers will not
be able to protect themselves from the dangers associated with doing
business with stations that cannot satisfy a judgment. If customers cannot
make an informed decision as to which stations they may safely frequent,
many innocent victims of an operator’s negligence, such as Jeremy Brans-
ford, will be left with the potentially devastating expense of injuries suf-
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fered when the oil companies and their service station operators gamble
on the unlikelihood of having to satisfy a judgment.168
The best way to address the dilemma faced by courts and to provide
consistency to the question of liability in oil company franchising is for
the Florida Legislature to define the liability of the parties involved in oil
company franchising arrangements.169 The legislative process provides a
forum for the consumer, the service station operator, and the oil compa-
nies to present their views on proposed reforms.170 The Legislature could
then take appropriate action in light of the policy to be implemented.171
There are several approaches the Legislature could take to give some di-
rection to the parties.
One way to produce some degree of predictability in franchising rela-
tionships is for the Legislature to mandate that conspicuous notices be
posted in all service stations—notices indicating which stations are actu-
ally controlled by oil companies and which stations, despite the display of
logos and indicia of large oil companies, are independently operated fran-
chises.172 This would give all parties involved the opportunity to conduct
their business with the realization that the oil company would remain li-
able for torts occurring at a station controlled by the company, while the
independently owned station would be solely liable for its negligence.
Although the oil companies and their franchisees would certainly mount a
strong lobby against any such notice requirement so that they could con-
tinue to profit from the public’s misperception regarding the ownership
and operation of the stations, the notice requirement would be fair and
equitable for all parties involved.
Another possibility is for the Legislature to mandate that all oil com-
panies adequately insure against injuries sustained at stations the company
owns.173 Oil companies could be required to obtain such insurance as a
condition precedent to the licensing of their franchisees.174 Although court
decisions usually hold that oil companies do not maintain control over
                                                                                                         
168. Although oil companies would prefer for consumers to believe that franchises are
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170. Davis, supra note 36, at 402.
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ers, allowing consumers to make informed decisions would arguably eliminate many ethical
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173. Davis, supra note 36, at 404.
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their service station operators,175 commentators have noted that such con-
trol would not be necessary for this system to be effective because the oil
companies would be able to use the inherent power created by the struc-
ture and economics of the distribution system to ensure that operators
maintain safe practices and avoid claims.176 The efficiency of this system
would be increased because oil companies are in a much better position to
negotiate favorable insurance rates than are their service station opera-
tors.177
B.   Judicial Neutrality
In the absence of legislative action, courts could better facilitate the
policy objectives behind the doctrine of apparent authority by applying the
doctrine to the oil company franchising industry with the same degree of
objectivity that the doctrine is applied outside of the franchising industry.
Although the development of the franchise industry has produced con-
cerns regarding the use of the apparent authority doctrine to impose li-
ability, excessive judicial control over the outcome of tort litigation has
led only to greater uncertainty in the industry.178 If judges continue to
usurp the function of the jury by devising theories to dictate the outcome
of tort cases based on apparent agency, juries will no longer be able to
address each case on its merits. Rather, the issue of franchisor liability
will be decided through sweeping policy decisions made by judges.
The argument that overly sympathetic juries will impose unwarranted
liability on large corporate franchisors is not sufficient justification for
completely abrogating the vital social objectives achieved by a system of
vicarious liability. The concern over biased jury decisions and excessive
awards is present in many tort actions not involving vicarious liability, yet
courts do not remove entire causes of action merely to eliminate this pos-
sibility.179 Rather, courts can reduce the occurrences of unfounded jury
verdicts by taking extra care to communicate to juries their responsibility
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to rule objectively when determining whether the plaintiff has proven the
elements of the apparent authority doctrine. The small number of jury
awards that are clearly unfounded can be reversed by a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict or ameliorated by remittitur of the award.180
If the jury is not permitted to address the merits of each apparent
agency action according to established principles of application, the courts
will cease to serve the function of applying the law according to the facts
of each situation.181 The result will be that individual plaintiffs will suffer
and no predictability will be possible because judges will continue to play
hide-the-ball by manipulating the elements of the apparent agency doc-
trine to achieve their policy objectives, often without realizing the full
impact their decisions will have on agency law jurisprudence.
C.   Adherence to the Common Knowledge Theory
Lastly, if the courts insist on implementing policy in the oil company
franchising industry by manipulating the apparent agency doctrine, they
should adhere consistently to the common knowledge theory. Although
statistical surveys have shown that the public actually has little under-
standing of which businesses are commonly operated by independent
franchisees and which are owned by the principal corporation itself,182 the
uniform application of this theory would eventually lead to an enhanced
public perception of the franchising industry. As the public becomes edu-
cated through court decisions, the media, and other methods of communi-
cation, some degree of predictability will result. This will allow potential
parties to plan accordingly—an effect that will ultimately achieve the pol-
icy goals behind the allocation of resources theory and the estoppel theory
to some extent, while also protecting the franchise industry from broad li-
ability.
Further, the common knowledge doctrine can be enforced to protect
only those industries that arguably should not be subjected to broad vi-
carious liability.183 Since only certain industries would be protected under
the doctrine, other businesses would not be able to escape liability by en-
tering into franchise arrangements merely to shield themselves from li-
ability. This would significantly reduce the “slippery slope” dilemma
created by the Mobil Oil decision, which provides incentive for business
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owners to relinquish control of their branch operations to insolvent third
parties in order to protect themselves from potential tort claims.
VI.   CONCLUSION
By dictating that franchisors cannot be held liable for the torts of their
franchisees under the doctrine of apparent agency despite overwhelming
indicia of franchisor control, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford has virtually abrogated apparent agency as a
theory of liability in the franchising industry.184 In doing so, the court has
sacrificed the social goals of economic efficiency and fundamental fair-
ness that can only be achieved through a system of vicarious liability.185
To achieve these goals without placing undue hardship on the franchising
industry, the Legislature should take action to delineate which party will
be held liable for tort claims in franchising arrangements, or the Legisla-
ture should mandate that franchisors insure their franchisees to some pre-
scribed minimum.186
If the Legislature refuses to act, courts should refrain from manipulat-
ing the elements of the apparent authority doctrine to keep decisions away
from the jury.187 Alternatively, courts should apply the common knowl-
edge doctrine consistently until the public becomes informed as to which
party maintains liability in certain franchising arrangements and can plan
accordingly.188 Only be producing a predictable system of liability without
abrogating vicarious liability can the vital policy goals of economic effi-
ciency and moral justice be implemented.
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